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Sammendrag 
Denne studien analyserer den privatøkonomiske avkastningen av offentlige FoU-subsidier, med et 
særlig fokus på rollen til Norges Forskningsråd (NFR). Vi adresserer spesielt spørsmålet om 
avkastningen av FoU er ulik for prosjekter som får prosjektstøtte fra NFR og FoU generelt. For å 
besvare dette, foreslår vi å bruke en fleksibel produktfunksjon som skiller mellom ulike typer FoU 
etter finansieringskilde. Vi undersøker virkningene på produktivitet og lønnsomhet av FoU ved å 
bruke et omfattende panel av norske foretak i perioden 2001−2009. Vår tilnærming krever ingen 
tilpasning av data for å kunne inkludere foretak som aldri investerer i FoU i analysen. Resultatene 
tyder på at avkastningen av FoU prosjekter støttet av NFR ikke er systemastisk forskjellig fra FoU 
prosjekter generelt. Våre estimater på den gjennomsnittlige avkstningsraten på FoU-investeringer 
foretatt av norske foretak i privat sektor er omtrent 10 prosent. 
1 Introduction
Both economic theory and empirical evidence support the view that R&D plays an
important role in raising productivity. The social returns to R&D investment is
often found to be higher than the private returns to the investing rm. Thus, in
the presence of market failure, policy intervention may be justied if a well-designed
intervention scheme can be implemented. R&D incentives are designed in many
di¤erent ways. Many countries o¤er tax credit schemes for R&D expenses and all
countries in the OECD o¤er scal incentives in the form of grants to R&D. Although
more countries have introduced tax incentives over time, there is no consensus on
what is best practice. Evaluation of the incentives in various countries may provide
some evidence on which policies or policy mixes work well.
Access to public grants may change a rms incentives for carrying out R&D
in several ways. One way is obviously by reducing the marginal cost of R&D and
hence also the required returns. Thus, one may suspect that publicly funded R&D
projects have lower private returns than internally funded projects in the absence of
the grant. Another way is by improving the liquidity of the rm. In the latter case,
the subsidy may nance R&D investments that would have been protable also in
the absence of subsidies (see Hall, 2002, and Cappelen et al., 2012, for discussions
of the importance of nancing constraints for R&D investments). The fact that
there are arguments that publicly funded projects should have lower returns than
privately funded R&D, but also for the opposite case, warrants a closer empirical
investigation.
In the existing empirical literature, the most common way of estimating returns
to R&D is to lump together all R&D spending for each rm or industry (or even
country) without distinguishing between sources of nance. Thus, it is implicitly
assumed that projects are perfect substitutes and have the same economic returns.
A more exible approach allows various projects to be perfect substitutes in terms
of economic returns, but without imposing this as an a priori restriction.
In this study we analyze a panel of Norwegian rms in all industries from 2001
to 2009 and focus on the productivity e¤ects of R&D grants given by the research
Council of Norway (RCN) as opposed to privately funded R&D. To assess the pro-
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ductivity e¤ects of R&D at the rm level, it is important to allow for the possibility of
running a viable rm without ever undertaking R&D.1 According to the Norwegian
R&D surveys, most rms report that they do not undertake any R&D. Nevertheless,
the most common way of specifying the underlying production function in the liter-
ature is to use a CobbDouglas function with R&D capital as a separate production
factor (cf. the survey in Hall et al., 2010), which does not fulll this requirement.
The standard approach is to estimate the model using only rms with positive R&D.
This creates a sample selection that may bias the results. Our results, based on a
exible production function that encompasses CobbDouglas as a special case, show
that the bias may indeed be large.
According to our preferred model, R&D projects subsidized by the RCN do not
have lower returns than R&D in general. To be more precise, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the productivity e¤ects of RCN-funded projects are similar to that
of ordinary R&D. Our estimate of the average rate of return to R&D spending by
Norwegian rms is 10 percent. This estimate is low compared to the rate of return
commonly observed in the international literature, cf. Hall et al. (2010).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents some studies relevant
to our investigation. Section 3 describes our theoretical framework for analyzing the
e¤ect of R&D on productivity. Section 4 shows how the variables are constructed
from various data sources, Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 o¤ers some
concluding comments.
2 Approaches to studying the relation between
R&D and productivity
Several models of the relationship between R&D investment and productivity at
the rm level have been proposed in the empirical literature. One general model
structure was proposed in Pakes and Griliches (1984), was used in Crepon, Duguet
and Mairesse (1998), and is usually referred to as the CDMmodel. Here rm output
1The proportion of rms reporting positive R&D in the survey varies from 25 percent to 37
percent during 20012009 with about 72 percent of rms never undertaking R&D. For rms with
more than 50 employees, the corresponding shares vary from 37 percent to 48 percent with about
49 percent of these rms never undertaking R&D in 20012009.
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is a function of input services and total factor productivity. Under the assumption
of a standard neoclassical production function with constant returns to scale, labor
productivity (net value added per man-hour) can be expressed as a function of
capital intensity (capital per man-hour), K=L, and total factor productivity, A:
Y=L = Af(K=L): (1)
The productivity level, A, in (1) is assumed to depend on several variables
relating to R&D, market factors, industry, and possibly other variables. One way
of specifying this model is to include an intangible factor knowledge capital
explicitly in equation (1) to capture the e¤ect of factors both internal and external
to the rm (see the survey by Hall et al., 2010). In the CDM framework, R&D
investment is not directly treated as the driving force of productivity, but is instead
assumed to inuence the productivity level A in equation (1) through product
and process innovations. An extension of this model is found in Hall et al. (2012)
where ICT investment is also included. A separate strand of literature looks at the
impact of R&D expenditures on innovation separately, cf. Mairesse and Mohnen
(2004), or Cappelen et al. (2012).
A common approach when specifying the e¤ects of R&D on productivity is to
link the productivity factor A in equation (1) to the R&D knowledge stock, R, by
assuming that
A = AR; (2)
where  is the elasticity of Y with respect to R, A is total factor productivity and
the knowledge capital stock, R, accumulates according to
Rt = (1  )Rt 1 + eRt 1; (3)
where  is the depreciation rate of the knowledge stock and eR is (real) R&D invest-
ment. If we assume the depreciation rate to be small, we can write
 ln(At ) = %( eRt 1=Yt 1) + at, (4)
where % is the rate of return to R&D, cf. Gri¢ th et al. (2004), and at = lnAt.
Equation (4) says that the growth rate of productivity depends linearly on R&D
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investment divided by net value added, lagged one year. On the other hand, if an
estimate (or qualied guess) of the depreciation rate is available, one can calculate
the R&D capital stock, R, using (3), and estimate (1)-(2) directly. Unfortunately,
little is known about the depreciation rate of R&D, although 0.15 is a value often
encountered in the literature (see Hall et al., 2010). If one is uncertain about the
depreciation rate of R&D, but is willing to assume that it is close to zero, model (4)
is an alternative. Both approaches are well worth pursuing in empirical work.
Using Italian data, Parisi et al. (2006) estimate the rate of return to knowledge
capital to be 4 percent. This is rather low, but is an interesting result for a country
with a relatively low R&D intensity in the business sector. Their results show that
when both R&D intensity and an indicator for process innovation are included in
the model, the R&D variable becomes insignicant. However, this result could be
due to a simultaneity problem between R&D and innovation. In addressing this
problem, Hall et al. (2012) found much higher returns to R&D for Italian rms.
There are few econometric studies using Norwegian rm data to estimate the rate
of return to R&D at the micro level. Klette and Johansen (1998) estimate a model
where the knowledge stock accumulates according to a log-linear process. Their
assumption is based on the idea that old capital and investment in new knowledge
capital are complementary, and therefore the more existing knowledge you have, the
higher is the marginal return to investment. They estimate the rate of depreciation
to be around 0.15 by imposing some identifying restrictions (no increasing returns to
knowledge production). Their estimated mean net rate of return varies considerably
across industries, with a mean value of 9 percent.
Gri¢ th et al. (2004) develop a generalization of the model leading to equation
(4). Based on theories of endogenous innovation and growth, technology transfer
is seen as a source of productivity growth for countries or industries behind the
technological frontier. Furthermore, R&D activities are seen as an important factor
in creating an absorptive capacity for new knowledge and technology in line with the
seminal paper by Cohen and Levinthal (1989). The specication chosen by Gri¢ th
et al. (2004) is
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 ln (At ) = %
eRt 1
Yt 1
+ Xt +  ln(
AF;t 1
At 1
) + 
eRt 1
Yt 1
ln(
AF;t 1
At 1
), (5)
where AF is the productivity level at the frontier (country or industry). The ratio
AF=Ameasures the distance to the technology frontier for each rm, and can be seen
as a way of capturing catch-upe¤ects. The last term on the right-hand side of (5)
captures the interaction between the distance from the frontier and R&D intensity,eR=Y . The idea is that the further a rm/industry/country lags behind the frontier,
the more it will benet from investing in capacity to learn from or imitate others.
Gri¢ th et al. (2004) nd that the technology gap variable, or catch-upvariable,
is not signicant when entered alone ( = 0), whereas all the other terms enter
signicantly. Their conclusion is that disregarding the interaction term in (5) may
lead to a potential misspecication, and hence produce a bias when estimating the
e¤ects of R&D investments on productivity growth.
An important feature of the (standard) approach is that the production func-
tion framework cannot be applied to all rms without modications, as it predicts
zero output for rms with zero R&D. In the literature using micro data, there are
several options available to circumvent that problem. One solution is simply to
study those rms that report positive R&D and neglect other rms. This strategy
denitely creates a sample selection problem that may bias estimates of the returns
to R&D, because selection depends on the level of R&D. The problem of sample
selection can be solved ad hoc by adding a small amount of R&D investment to rms
with zero reported R&D, which makes it technically possible to include them in the
analysis. A renement of this solution is suggested by Gri¢ th et al. (2006) and Hall
et al. (2012). Relying on the CDM approach, they replace observed R&D spending
with imputed R&D using data for all rms. In this way, zero R&D investment is
replaced by nonzero imputed R&D. While this approach may perhaps be justied
for rms who report zero R&D in some years, it is clearly speculative to do so for
the large proportion of rms (almost 50 percent in our sample) that consistently
report zero R&D spending over time. For these rms, it is not justied to dismiss
zero R&D as a mere measurement error. Finally, one may specify a more exible
functional form that allows zero R&D, as suggested already by Griliches (1979).
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The advantage of this solution is that one avoids altering the data or the sample.
This is the approach favored in the current paper.
3 Theoretical framework
Our starting point is a production function that is homogeneous of degree one in
number of man-hours (L), real capital (K), and a measure of aggregate R&D capital
(F ). We assume
Y = AL0K1(L+ F )2 ; (6)
where Y is production measured as net value added, i.e., net of depreciation, in
constant prices, A is total factor productivity (unexplained e¢ ciency), and F is
an aggregate of two types of R&D capital, N and O;
F = (N +O)
1
 . (7)
In (7) we distinguish between RCN-funded R&D capital, N , and other R&D capital,
O = R   N . N is obtained by using (3) with R and eR replaced by N and eN ,
respectively. Note that the elasticity of substitution between the two types of R&D
capital equals s = 1=(1 ). If the distribution parameter  6= 1, N and O enter the
aggregate asymmetrically with N being less productive (for given N and O), then
 is lower. In particular, the marginal product of N is higher than that of O when
N=O < s. The special case s = 1 ( = 1) is particularly important. Then  = 1
implies that the two types of R&D capital have the same marginal productivity,
whereas  < 1 implies that the lower the share of RCN nance, the higher the
marginal product of R&D. Note that F di¤ers from R unless s =1 and  = 1.
The specication (6), unlike (2), allows the (aggregate) R&D variable, F , to be
zero without implying Y = 0. Two limiting cases are of particular interest: (i)
! 0, in which case (6) approaches a CobbDouglas production function in L; K,
and F , and (ii) !1, which we will analyze in more detail below. Note that the
model is invariant with respect to choice of scale.2
2For example, replacing F by F  = F=k, gives
Y = AL0K1(L+ kF )2 = k2AL0K1(

k
L+ F )2 = AL0K1(L+ F )2 ,
which has the same form as (6).
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We argued in the Introduction that RCN-funded projects may have either higher
or lower returns than privately funded R&D. Thus our conjecture is that the de-
composition of R into N and O, i.e., the ratio N=O, may not matter much for the
marginal productivity of R&D. Hence our null hypothesis is that s =1 and  = 1.
Our alternative hypothesis is that  6= 1.
Assuming 0 + 1 + 2 = 1 (constant returns to scale), it follows from (6) that
Y
L
= A

K
L
1 
+
F
L
2
: (8)
Taking logarithms of both sides of (8) and reformulating, we obtain
y = a + 1k + 2 ln (+ f) , (9)
where
y = ln(Y=L), a = lnA, k = ln(K=L) and f = F=L.
From (8) and (9) it follows that
ElFY = f
@y
@f
= 2 (+ f)
 1 f (10)
ElLY = 1  1   ElFY
ElKY = 1:
To study the case where  is large, we reformulate (9) as
y = a + 1k + 2 ln

1 +
f


(11)
where
2 = 2= and a
 = a+ 2 ln. (12)
Where  is large,
ln

1 +
f


' f=: (13)
Then we can reformulate (11) as
y = a + 1k + 2f , (14)
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It follows that
ElFY = 2f (15)
ElLY = 1  1   2f:
Note that the parameter 2 in (14) has a di¤erent interpretation from 2 in (9).
The limiting case of (14), i.e., when s = 1, is particularly interesting because
it allows an approximation when the depreciation rate of R&D capital, , is small,
similar to Gri¢ th et al. (2004). Then, as we show in Appendix A,
yt ' at + 1kt + %
 eRt 1
Yt 1
!
+ %(  1)
 eNt 1
Yt 1
!
   lnLt, (16)
where % can be interpreted as the expected return to R&D: %  E (@Y=@F ) and 
is the expected (mean) value of ElFY :   E(ElFY ).
4 Sample and variable construction
For our analysis, we have constructed a panel of annual rm-level data for Norwegian
rms with at least three consecutive observations during 20012009. The base for the
sample is the R&D statistics, which are survey data collected by Statistics Norway.
These data comprise detailed information about rmsR&D activities, such as total
R&D expenses (divided into internally performed R&D and externally purchased
R&D), grants from the RCN, the number of employees engaged in R&D activities,
and the number of man-hours worked in R&D. Each survey contains about 5000
rms. Only rms with more than 50 employees are automatically included in the
survey. For smaller rms (with 549 employees) a stratied sampling scheme is
employed. The stratication is based on industry classication (NACE codes) and
rm size. However, these smaller rms are not representative of rms of their size
and industry, because they have a higher probability of engaging in R&D. Hence, to
reduce the problem of endogenous sample selection, we include only rms with more
than 50 employees in our analysis. Currently, data are available for 1993, 1995, 1997,
1999, and annually from 2001 to 2009. The information from all available surveys
is used for the construction of R&D capital stocks.
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Table 1: Overview of variables and data sources
Variables Denition Data sources
Y Output (net value added) accounts statisticseR R&D investments R&D statisticseN Grants from the RCN R&D statistics
R Total R&D capital stock R&D statistics
N RCN-nanced R&D capital stock R&D statistics
K Total capital stock accounts statistics
L Man-hours REE
h Share of man-hours worked by high-skilled workers REE, NED
Derived variables:
y Log of labor productivity: ln(Y=L)
k Log of capital intensity: ln(K=L)
O R N
F (N +O)
1

f F=L
The data from the R&D statistics are supplemented with data from three dif-
ferent registers: The accounts statistics, the Register of Employers and Employees
(REE), and the National Education Database (NED). Table 1 presents an overview
of the main variables and data sources used in our study. The data sources are
described in more detail in Appendix B.
Output, Y , is net value added at factor cost and computed as the sum of oper-
ating prots net of depreciation and labor costs and deated by the consumer price
index. R&D investment, eR, is yearly R&D investment and eN are the grants from
RCN as they are reported in the questionnaire, deated by a price index for R&D
investment based on the price indices from the national accounts for the various
components making up total R&D. According to Hall et al. (2010) the choice of
deator for R&D expenditures usually does not matter much for the econometric
results for the main parameters of interest.
The (real) R&D capital stock (R) at the beginning of a given year t is computed
by the perpetual inventory method using (3) and a constant rate of depreciation 
= 0:15 (for details, see Cappelen et al., 2012). Following Hall and Mairesse (1995),
the benchmark for the R&D capital stock at the beginning of the observation period
for a given rm, R1, is calculated as if it were the result of an innite R&D investment
series, eR t, t = 0; 1; 2; :::, with a xed presample growth rate g = 0:05 (cf. equation
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(5) in Hall and Mairesse, 1995). A separate capital stock, N , is calculated in the
same way, using eN instead of eR to accumulate the capital stock. Then O = R N
is the R&D capital stock nanced from other sources than RCN.
To construct the physical capital stock,K, we used information from the accounts
statistics. The accounts statistics distinguish between several groups of physical
assets. To obtain consistent denitions of asset categories over the whole sample
period, all assets have been divided into only two types: equipment, denoted by e,
which includes machinery, vehicles, tools, furniture and transport equipment, and
buildings and land, denoted by b. The expected lifetimes of the physical assets in
group e (of about 310 years) are considerably lower than those of the assets in group
b (about 4060 years). Total capital, K, is then an aggregate of equipment capital,
e, and building capital, b. We use the book value as a measure of the capital stock.
This is justied on the grounds of the short time series for each rm and corresponds
to the approach taken by Power (1998) and Baily et al. (1992). When aggregating
the two capital types, we use a Törnqvist volume index with time-varying weights
that are common across rms in the same industry (see OECD, 2001).
Man-hours, L, is the sum of all individual man-hours worked by employees in
the given rm according to the contract. For each rm, we distinguish between two
educational groups, high- and low-skilled. High-skilled workers are those who have
postsecondary education, i.e., persons who have studied for at least 13 years (for
a description of the educational levels, see Table 6 in Appendix B). To construct
h, man-hours worked by high-skilled persons are aggregated to the rm level and
divided by the total number of man-hours worked in the rm.
As mentioned above, to avoid the problem of endogenous sample selection, only
rms with more than 50 employees are included in our analysis. We further exclude
from the sample rms with incomplete information or with extreme values for the
variables of interest. We need to use the panel structure of the data in order to
address the endogeneity problem that arises with respect to input choices and to
be able to conduct a dynamic analysis. Hence, only rms with observations in
at least three consecutive years are kept. The nal sample contains about 1900
rms. Descriptive statistics for the main variables and rms in the nal sample are
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presented in Appendix C.
5 Implementations and results
5.1 Estimation
In addition to the variables in Eq. (9), our analysis includes the share of man-
hours worked by high-skilled workers, hit, dummies for the rms age, industry, and
location, whether the rm cooperates with other rms in their R&D activities, and
whether the rm uses an external research institute for their R&D. The dummy
variables are collected in the vector Di. Then
yit = 1kit + 2 ln(1 + fit=) + 3hit + 
0
4Di + i + it, (17)
where the indices i = 1; :::; N and t = 1; :::; T denote rm and time, respectively, i
represents a xed rm-specic e¤ect and it is an error term. We allow the error
term, it, in (17) to follow a rst-order autoregressive process, i.e.,
it = i;t 1 + "it, (18)
where
jj < 1, E["it] = 0, E["2it] = 2"
and
Cov["it; "jt] = 0 if t 6= s or i 6= j.
Multiplying (17) by  and quasi-di¤erencing, we get a dynamic panel data equation:
yit = yi;t 1 + 1kit + '1ki;t 1 + 2 ln(1 + fit=) + '2 ln(+ fi;t 1) (19)
+ 3hit + '3hi;t 1 + '04Di +$i + "it,
where
'1 =  1, '2 =  2; '3 =  3,
'4 = (1  )4, $i = (1  )i: (20)
Equation (19) is a rst-order di¤erence equation, which can be solved by repeated
substitution of lagged values yi;t 1, yi;t 2, and so forth. If we do this, we will see that
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every value of yit depends on !i and all "i;t s for s  0. Thus, yi;t 1 is correlated
with the rm-specic e¤ect, !i, but not with "it. Moreover, we assume that kit, fit
and hit are predetermined endogenous variables, i.e., determined at the beginning
of t, and hence correlated with !i and "i;t s for s > 0.
Even if the nonlinear parameters (; ; ) were known, the estimation of equa-
tion (19) by means of least squares will give inconsistent estimators. The usual
method for addressing the endogeneity problem is to estimate equation (19) in rst-
di¤erenced form in order to exclude !i from the equation and then use instruments
for the endogenous variables.
To estimate the model, we performed a grid search in the (; ; )-space, where,
for each value of (; ; ), we estimate the remaining parameters in (19) using the
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond
(1991), which uses lagged levels and rst di¤erences of the endogenous variables as
instruments. Their method is implemented in STATA as xtabond. Our iterative
estimation procedure converges when the GMM-criterion function of Arellano and
Bond is minimized 3. Table 10 in Appendix C shows the value of the criterion
function for a wide range of (s; )-values when  = 1. It turned out that bs = 1
(b = 1) and b > 140 for all  2 [0; 2], and hence for all reasonable values of . For
all practical purposes we can therefore assume also that b =1. Inserting  = 1 in
(7), we can write
f = F=L = N=L+O=L
= R=L+ (  1)N=L. (21)
Moreover, because  is large, it follows from (13) that ln(1 + fit=) can be replaced
by fit=. Using (12) and (21) in (17), we then obtain
yit = 1kit + 

2
Rt
Lt
+ 2(  1)
Nt
Lt
+ 3hit + 
0
4Di + i + it. (22)
The corresponding dynamic regression equation can be expressed as
yit = yi;t 1 + 1kit + '1ki;t 1 + 2
Rt
Lt
+ 2(  1)
Nt
Lt
+
'2
Rt 1
Lt 1
+ '2(  1)
Nt 1
Lt 1
+ 3hit + '3hi;t 1 + '04Di +$i + "it, (23)
3This is asymptotically equivalent to maximizing the Wald statistic provided by STATA as a
goodness-of-t test of the model against an alternative with only a constant term.
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where '2 =  2 and "it is white noise.
Note that the parameters 1; 2 and 3, can be interpreted both as short- and
long-run coe¢ cients under the restrictions (20). For example, from (23) the long-run
e¤ect on yit of a permanent unit change in kit equals (1 + '1)=(1   ), which is
equal to 1 under the restrictions (20). Similarly, the long-run coe¢ cient of R=L, is
(2 +'

2)=(1 ), which is equal to 2 . There are several possible estimators of the
long-run coe¢ cients. One is the estimated coe¢ cient of kit in (23), b1. However, this
estimator is not robust against specication errors in (20). A more robust estimator
is the long-term coe¢ cient of kit derived from (23): bLR1 = (b1+ b'1)=(1  b). If the
model is correctly specied, b1 should be close to bLR1 . A third method is to impose
(20) a priori when estimating (23). We will pursue the rst and second approach
here and test whether the restrictions (20) are valid or not.
The nal estimates are presented in Table 2. As a benchmark we also present
xed-e¤ects (FE) estimators of (22). The FE estimator is a conventional within-
estimator applied to equation (22). However, this method yields biased estimates
due to the endogeneity of explanatory variables, as described above.
Both the FE and GMM estimators of the coe¢ cient of the aggregate R&D capital
stock variable, Rt=Lt, are positive and signicant. However, the estimated (long-
run) coe¢ cient is notably smaller using FE (0.10) than GMM (0.29). Note that the
estimated short-run coe¢ cient of Rt=Lt (0.23) is close to the long-run coe¢ cient
(0.29). This gives support to the parameter restrictions (20). The estimates of
2(   1) (the coe¢ cient of Nt=Lt ) are not signicantly di¤erent from zero when
using any of the methods. These results indicate that R&D capital subsidized by
RCN adds no more or less to a rms productivity than other R&D projects and
that this is a robust nding.
As expected, we nd a signicant positive relation between capital intensity, k,
and labor productivity: the estimated elasticity of tangible capital is around 0.1
using GMM. The FE estimate is much smaller. Seen together, these results indicate
that the FE estimator of the coe¢ cients of both the physical capital stock (k) and
the R&D capital stock (R=L) are biased downwards. With regard to the variable
h (share of man-hours by high skilled workers), the results are ambiguous. GMM
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Table 2: GMM estimates of the productivity equation. Robust standard errors in
brackets
Dependent variable: yt GMM-estimates FE (Within)
Explanatory variables,a) short-run coe¤.b) long-run coe¤.c) estimatesd)
yt 1 0:38 [0:03]    
kt 0:09 [0:02]
 0:10 [0:03] 0:03 [0:00]
kt 1  0:03 [0:02]    
Rt=Lt 0:23 [0:03]
 0:29 [0:06] 0:10 [0:04]
Rt 1=Lt 1  0:05 [0:03]    
Nt=Lt  0:59 [0:38]  1:00 [1:44]  0:60 [1:26]
Nt 1=Lt 1  0:02 [0:77]    
ht  0:09 [0:16] 0:14 [0:24] 0:16 [0:08]
ht 1 0:18 [0:14]
Number of observations 7124 10976
Number of rms 1886 1886
R2 0:17
Notes: signicant at 10 percent signicant at 5 percent signicant at 1 percent
a) Dummies for rm age, region, industry, cooperation, and time are included in the analysis,
but not reported here
b) Estimates of coe¢ cients of dynamic equation (23): b; bk; b'k, etc.
c) Derived long-run coe¢ cients from (23): (bk + b'k)=(1  b), etc.
d) Fixed-e¤ects estimator of (22)
yields no signicant coe¢ cient estimates, whereas the FE estimator is positive, but
signicant only at the 10 percent level. The reason may be that both the FE and
GMM estimator eliminate regressors that are constant over time, and poorly identify
e¤ects of variables that exhibit little within-rm variation, which is the case for hit.
The estimate of  in Table 2 the coe¢ cient of yi;t 1 is equal to 0.38 and is
highly signicant. Thus the error term in (19) exhibits strong serial correlation. Note
that from (19) and (20) the coe¢ cient, '2, of Rt 1=Lt 1 should satisfy the constraint
'2 =  2. This constraint, and the other parameter restrictions in (20), are tested
in Table 3. Neither of the restrictions is rejected by the statistical tests. As also
seen from Table 3, the ArellanoBond test of zero rst-order autocorrelation in the
error term it in (22) is rejected, but not for second-order autocorrelation. This
conrms that it follows a rst-order autoregressive process, as assumed in (18). We
also applied a Sargan test to test the validity of the overidentifying restrictions with
regard to the instrumental variables. With a 2-test statistic of 125:55 and 121
degrees of freedom, we cannot reject this hypothesis. All these specication tests,
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seen together, give strong support to our econometric specication.
Table 3: Test of parameter restrictions and signicance of derived long-run coe¢ -
cients
Observed value (z) Level of signicance
of test statistic (Z) Pr(Z > z)
Test of parameter restrictions (20):
'1 =  1 0:32 0:75
'2 =  2 1:38 0:17
'3 =  3 1:21 0:23
(  1)'2 =  '2(  1)  0:32 0:75
ArellanoBond test of zero autocorrelation in errors
order 1  10:74 0:00
order 2 0:28 0:77
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 125:55 0:10
Notes: t-test test statistics is distributed as 2(107)
5.2 Return to R&D
GMM is the most appropriate method to handle the problem of endogeneity and
autocorrelation in the residuals. From the GMM estimates in Table 2, we can
calculate the elasticity of net value added with respect to R&D, ElFY , for any rm.
Using (15),
ElFY = 2
F
L
;
whereas the marginal return to R&D capital, @Y=@F , equals
@Y
@F
= 2
Y
L
:
Using our long-run estimate of 2 (= 0:29) and the mean value of F=L for
rms with positive R&D (= 0:116), we nd that the estimated mean of ElFY is
3.3 percent. The derived marginal returns have a mean value of 10.1 percent and
median of 7.9 percent (see Table 4). Other percentiles are also depicted, e.g., the
10 percent and 90 percent percentiles are 5.1 and 15.3 percent, respectively. These
gures are within the range of estimates obtained in the empirical literature.
To illustrate the robustness of these results, Table 4 shows the distribution of
@Y=@F when the model is estimated either on the full sample (superscript a) or the
subsample of rms with positive R&D capital stock (superscript b), and also in the
case when  = 0 (i.e., a CobbDouglas production function). Both the mean value
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Table 4: Distribution of marginal returns to R&D, @Y=@F , for di¤erent models
Model specication Mean Percentiles
10 % 25 % 50 % 75 % 90 %
Main model,a) with  =1
All rms 0.101 0.051 0.062 0.079 0.108 0.153
Only rms with R > 0 0.108 0.051 0.063 0.083 0.114 0.160
Main model,b) with  =1
Only rms with R > 0 0.123 0.059 0.072 0.095 0.130 0.183
CobbDouglas b) ( = 0)
Only rms with R > 0 0.574 0.152 0.683 2.415 10.912 41.582
Notes: a) Estimated on full sample of rms; b) Estimated on subsample of rms having R > 0
and the percentiles in the distribution of @Y=@F are shown in each case. The main
ndings from Table 4 are that for our estimated (main) model (i.e.,  = 1), the
distribution of @Y=@F is not sensitive to whether we exclude rms with zero R&D
or not, which is a strength of our model specication. On the other hand, if we
assume a CobbDouglas production function ( = 0), the distribution of @Y=@F
changes dramatically. The estimated mean return now becomes 57.4 percent and
the median return becomes 241 percent, which are implausible numbers.
An alternative approach to estimating the average return to R&D is provided by
the model described in equation (16), which assumed a smalldepreciation rate ,
s = 1 and  = 1. Under the same assumptions regarding the error term "it and
explanatory variables as above, we can rewrite (16) as
yit = 1kit   lnLit+ %
 eRi;t 1
Yi;t 1
!
+ %(  1)
 eNi;t 1
Yi;t 1
!
+ 3hit+"it, (24)
where %  E (@Y=@F ) and   E(ElFY ) (cf. (16)).
The estimation results for (24) are presented in Table 5, together with an ex-
tended version of the model, which is similar to Gri¢ th et al. (2004), i.e., when the
productivity gap variable (Af=A) is included as an explanatory variable as in (5).
The dependent variable is the rst-di¤erenced log net value added per man-hour,
yt. In this model the assumed rate of depreciation of R&D capital is small so that
R&D intensity is the relevant variable to include as discussed earlier. The advantage
of this approach is that we do not need to assume any specic number for the depre-
ciation rate (only that it is small), nor do we have to impute the initial R&D capital
stock. Looking at the instrumental variable estimates in the rst column of Table
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Table 5: GMM estimates of productivity growth equation. Standard errors are
shown in brackets
Dependent variable: 4yt Instrumental variable estimates
Explanatory variablesa) Basic model (24) Extended model as in (5)
kt  0:006 [0:006]  0:004 [0:006]
  ln(Lt) 0:244 [0:029] 0:214 [0:028]eRt 1=Yt 1 0:063 [0:029] 0:132 [0:052]eNt 1=Yt 1  0:550 [0:554]  1:092 [1:334]
ln(Af=A)t 1   0:105 [0:008]eRt 1=Yt 1  ln(Af=A)t 1    0:059 [0:039]eNt 1=Yt 1  ln(Af=A)t 1   0:348 [1:044]
ht  0:380 [0:183]  0:339 [0:181]
Number of observations 7124 7124
Number of rms 1886 1886
R2 0:048 0:086
Notes: signicant at 10 percent signicant at 5 percent signicant at 1 percent
a)Dummies for rm age, region, industry, cooperation, and time are included in the analysis,
but not reported here.
5 we obtain an estimate of the real rate of return to R&D (%) of about 6 percent,
whereas the estimate for the extended model (second column) is 13.2 percent. This
latter estimate is almost signicant at the 1 percent level, and close to the mean
return derived from the model of Table 2 (estimated to be 10 percent).
The coe¢ cient of   ln(Lt) in Table 5 can be interpreted as the (expected)
elasticity of Y with respect to R&D capital, F , and is estimated as 24.4 percent.
This is much higher than the estimated mean of ElFY implied by the GMM estimates
in Table 2 (3.3 percent). On the other hand, the estimate of the elasticity of tangible
capital is negative, although insignicant. The e¤ect on productivity of an increase
in the share of employees with high education, ht, is also estimated to be negative.
More importantly, we have included a variable capturing the productivity e¤ect
of having R&D nance from RCN, eN=Y . The estimated coe¢ cient is insignicant,
implying that rms that receive nance from the RCN have the same returns on their
R&D as rms that do not receive any funding from the RCN. Thus, in this case also
our results support the view that we can add both kinds of R&D investments into a
common aggregate, eR = eN + eO, because the rate of return to R&D is independent
of the source of nance.
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The second column of Table 5 shows the result of estimating equation (24) when
we include the productivity gap variable (Af=A) as in (5). This variable enters with
a signicant positive coe¢ cient, meaning that rms that are far behind the frontier
are catching upto rms that are close to the frontier. However, contrary to Gri¢ th
et al.s (2004) ndings, the estimated coe¢ cient of the absorptive capacityterm,
i.e., R&D intensity ( eR=eY ) interacting with the productivity gap variable (Af=A),
is insignicant. Again, we do not reject that RCN-funded projects have the same
productivity e¤ects as R&D in general.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the e¤ects of R&D on rm performance with a par-
ticular focus on R&D spending partly nanced by the Research Council of Norway
(RCN), using a comprehensive panel of Norwegian rms over the period 2001-2009.
We have based our study on econometric models of the relationship between labor
productivity and R&D. A number of specic assumptions need to be made to esti-
mate the e¤ects of R&D on productivity. In particular one must address whether
or not to calculate the stock of R&D capital, or simply use R&D investment as an
explanatory variable. We have specied several versions of our model to study the
robustness of our results. An important issue is how to treat rms with zero R&D
spending (about 50 percent of the rms in our sample). The model suggested in this
study allows rms to have positive output without having a positive R&D capital
stock, which contrasts with the classical CobbDouglas production model. Thus we
have avoided manipulation of the data that would have been required to incorporate
rms with zero R&D spending. Moreover, we distinguish between di¤erent types
of R&D according to funding source and allow di¤erent projects to be imperfect
substitutes in terms of economic returns.
The estimates of our preferred model yield results that are generally in line with
the existing literature. R&D spending stimulates productivity growth at the rm
level even after controlling for a number of possible e¤ects relating to industries,
common shocks, etc. We nd that RCN-funded R&D spending generally has the
same e¤ect on productivity as total R&D spending and conclude that the source
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of nance of R&D matters little for the e¤ects of R&D on productivity. To the
extent that subsidies and grants from RCN increase R&D in the business sector,
the e¤ect is captured by a common R&D capital stock variable that includes all
R&D spending, regardless of the source of nance. Based on our preferred model
we estimate the returns to R&D to be roughly 10 percent and this rate of return
applies both to RCN-funded and rm-funded R&D.
We have also found that when using our preferred specication of the production
function at the rm level, it matters little for the estimated rate of return to R&D
whether or not we include rms with zero R&D spending in the estimation sample;
including only rms with positive R&D just marginally increases the estimated rate
of return to R&D. On the other hand, when using a standard CobbDouglas pro-
duction function and limiting the sample only to rms with positive R&D spending,
the estimated returns to R&D becomes implausibly high.
The main argument for government subsidizes to R&D is usually that R&D cre-
ates spill over e¤ects so that rms do not get all the returns from its own investment
in R&D. Our nding suggests that this cannot be the only reason for public sub-
sidies to R&D, since projects nanced by the RCN earn a standard private rate of
return. Instead, nancing constraints or capital market imperfections seem to be
the main obstacles for R&D in Norway. However, it may be the case the RCN has
a tendency to select projects based on their internal rate of return supplemented
by a statement by the applicant relating to additionality (that the project will not
be carried out without the subsidy). If this is the case there is a possibility that
current RCN practice to some extent neglects projects with low private returns but
high social returns. Thus RCN should review its criteria in selecting R&D projects
so that private returns are not emphasized too much compared to social returns.
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Appendix A: Derivation of (16)
By di¤erencing (14), we obtain
yt = a

t + 1kt + 

2ft. (25)
If  is small and s =1, then Ft = Rt + (  1)Nt and Ft=Ft 1 ' eRt 1=Ft 1 +
(  1) eNt=Ft 1. Now
ft ' Lt 1Ft   Ft 1Lt
L2t 1
=
Ft
Ft 1
ft 1 Lt
Lt 1
ft 1 ' ft 1( eRt 1=Ft 1+( 1) eNt=Ft 1  lnL):
(26)
Thus
yt ' at + 1kt + 2ft 1
 eRt 1
Ft 1
+ (  1)
eNt
Ft 1
!
  2ft 1 lnLt:
Dening  =ElFY and % = @Y=@F , then by denition  = %F=Y , and from (15) 
= 2f . Finally, from (25) and (26),
yt ' at + 1kt + 
 eRt 1
Ft 1
+ (  1)
eNt
Ft 1
!
   lnLt
= at + 1kt + %
Ft 1
Yt 1
 eRt 1
Ft 1
+ (  1)
eNt
Ft 1
!
   lnLt
= at + 1kt + %
 eRt 1
Yt 1
!
+ %(  1)
eNt
Ft 1
   lnLt:
26
Appendix B. Data sources
Accounts statistics: All joint-stock companies in Norway are obliged to publish com-
pany accounts every year. The accounts statistics contain information obtained from
the income statements and balance sheets of joint-stock companies, in particular, the
information about operating revenues, operating costs and result, labor costs, the
book values of a rms tangible xed assets at the end of a year, their depreciation,
and write-downs.
The structural statistics: The term structural statisticsis a general name for
statistics of di¤erent industrial activities, such as manufacturing, building and con-
struction, wholesale and retail trade statistics, etc. They all have the same structure
and include information about production, input factors, and investments at the rm
level. These structural statistics are organized according to the NACE standard and
are based on General Trading Statements, which are given in an appendix to the tax
return. In addition to some variables, which are common to those in the accounts
statistics, the structural statistics contain data about purchases of tangible xed
assets and operational leasing. These data were matched with the data from the
accounts statistics. As the rm identication number here and further we use the
number given to the rm under registration in the Register of Enterprises, one of
the Brønnøysund registers, which has operated from 1995.
R&D statistics: R&D statistics are the survey data collected by Statistics Nor-
way every second year up to 2001 and annually from then on. These data comprise
detailed information about rmsR&D activities, in particular, about total R&D
expenses with division into internally performed R&D and externally performed
R&D services, the number of employees engaged in R&D activities and the number
of man-years worked in R&D. In each wave, the sample is selected with a stratied
method for rms with 1050 employees, whereas rms with more than 50 employees
are all included. Strata are based on industry and rm size. Each survey contains
about 5000 rms, although many of them do not provide complete information.
Register of Employers and Employees (REE): The REE contains information
obtained from employers. All employers are obliged to send information to the REE
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about each individual employees contract start and end, working hours, overtime
and occupation. An exception is made only if a person works less than four hours
per week in a given rm and/or was employed for less than six days. In addition,
this register contains identication numbers for the rm and the employee, hence,
the data can easily be aggregated to the rm level.
National Education Database (NED): The NED gathers all individually based
statistics on education from primary to tertiary education and has been provided
by Statistics Norway since 1970. We use this data set to identify the length of
education. For this purpose, we utilize the rst digit of the NUS variable. This
variable is constructed on the basis of the Norwegian Standard Classication of
Education and is a six-digit number, the leading digit of which is the code for the
educational level of the person. According to the Norwegian standard classication
of education (NUS89), there are nine educational levels in addition to the major
group for unspecied length of education. Education levels are given in Table 6.
Table 6: Educational levels
Tripartition of levels Level Class level
0 Under school age
Primary education 1 1st 7th
2 8th 10th
Secondary education 3 11-12th
4 12th 13th
5 14th 17th
Postsecondary education 6 14th 18th
7 18th 19th
8 20th+
9 Unspecied
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Appendix C: Tables with descriptive statistics
Table 7: Descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the nal sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max
Y a) 10976 234071 2518593 3953 1.48E+08eRa) 10976 6444 41758 0 1551539
Ra) 10976 38182 231021 0 6982151eNa) 10976 70 667 0 32311
Na) 10976 371 2285 0 51769
Ka) 10976 47449 642380 1.5 2.88e+07
Lb) 10976 475042 1033602 42862 3.40E+07
hc) 10976 0.262 0.218 0 0.937
y 10976 -1.233 0.509 -3.644 1.766
k 10976 -4.313 1.623 -11.566 2.198
f 10976 0.133 0.379 0 6.94eR=Y 10976 0.045 0.146 0 0.937
Notes: a)- in 1000 NOK; b)- in man-hours; c)- in shares
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Table 8: Firmsdescription in the nal sample, 1886 rms
Firm characteristics Share of rms
(in %)
eR=Y R=L N=L h
(in %)
All rms 100 0.049 0.079 0.0011 25.8
5099 employees 41.6 0.066 0.108 0.0018 26.3
100249 employees 36.9 0.037 0.071 0.0008 26.0
250+ employees 21.5 0.028 0.065 0.0005 26.2
age 02 13.8 0.057 0.088 0.0018 27.1
age 35 13.2 0.055 0.089 0.0013 28.4
age 69 13.4 0.049 0.087 0.0012 30.4
age 1014 15.9 0.046 0.092 0.0013 27.4
age 15+ 40.6 0.042 0.078 0.0009 23.9
Capital region 29.8 0.051 0.114 0.0014 37.1
East coast 15.8 0.045 0.077 0.0005 20.2
East innland 6.5 0.039 0.071 0.0014 16.0
South 17.4 0.051 0.090 0.0015 24.8
West 16.9 0.035 0.045 0.0006 20.9
Central Norway 7.2 0.047 0.078 0.0010 22.5
North 6.4 0.029 0.041 0.0010 21.2
Manufacturing 50.0 0.049 0.082 0.0009 18.8
Construction 6.9 0.003 0.005 0.0001 14.3
Retail trade 8.1 0.029 0.063 0.0001 27.0
Transport 14.1 0.009 0.029 0.0003 21.2
Services 10.8 0.126 0.225 0.0048 65.6
Other industries 10.0 0.041 0.094 0.0013 40.6
Note: Based on the rst rm-year observations
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Table 9: Description of main variables by time period
20012003 20042006 20072009
Number of rms 1351 1652 1416eR=Y 0.052 0.044 0.039
R=L 0.070 0.085 0.086
N=L 0.001 0.001 0.001
h 24.8 % 26.2 % 26.8 %
Share of rms (R&D_av > 0) 54.4 % 54.7 % 49.6 %eR=Y j R&D_av > 0 0.095 0.080 0.078
R=L j R&D_av > 0 0.123 0.145 0.156
N=L j R&D_av > 0 0.002 0.002 0.002
h j R&D_av > 0 26.8 % 29.4 % 31.4 %
Share of rms (all R&D > 0) 37.2 % 38.9 % 36.0 %eR=Y j all R&D > 0 0.128 0.104 0.104
R=L j all R&D > 0 0.166 0.192 0.204
N=L j all R&D > 0 0.003 0.003 0.003
h j all R&D > 0 28.6 % 31.4 % 32.7 %
Share of rms (RCN_av > 0) 7.8 % 5.9 % 6.4 %
N=L j RCN_av > 0 0.008 0.011 0.014
Share of rms ( all RCN > 0) 1.5 % 2.0 % 2.5 %
N=L j all RCN > 0 0.027 0.023 0.023
Note: R&D_av > 0 when eR > 0 in at least one year in the given period,
all R&D > 0 when eR > 0 in all years in the given period (the same for RCN).
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Table 10: Value of criterion function to be maximized in grid search over di¤erent
(s; )-values when  = 1
sn 0.01 ... 0.09 0.1 0.2 ... 1 ... 130 140 150
1.001 1061.19 ... 1149.16 1150.19 1145.59 ... 1129.76 ... 1121.67 1121.66 1121.66
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
1.01 1056.74 ... 1145.17 1146.60 1144.44 ... 1130.74 ... 1119.10 1118.98 1118.87
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
1.05 1047.34 ... 1128.91 1130.69 1135.58 ... 1138.58 ... 1102.59 1102.09 1101.64
1.1 1050.79 ... 1121.44 1121.83 1122.32 ... 1116.78 ... 1083.55 1083.52 1083.44
1.15 1050.27 ... 1115.37 1114.27 1105.71 ... 1066.65 ... 1077.65 1078.18 1078.78
1.2 1042.46 ... 1104.13 1103.25 1098.44 ... 1057.50 ... 1093.67 1095.16 1096.55
1.25 1032.06 ... 1093.33 1093.39 1095.06 ... 1054.19 ... 1104.66 1105.82 1106.87
1.3 1022.13 ... 1082.66 1083.44 1090.60 ... 1052.29 ... 1110.79 1111.64 1112.40
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
5 969.93 ... 1008.55 1009.35 1038.12 ... 1061.74 ... 1330.03 1349.04 1348.84
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
90 968.21 ... 1006.52 1007.18 1036.16 ... 1063.40 ... 1344.17 1350.53 1350.37
100 968.20 ... 1006.51 1007.17 1036.15 ... 1063.40 ... 1344.23 1350.58 1350.39
s =1 968.14 ... 1006.44 1007.09 1036.08 ... 1063.46 ... 1344.66 1350.60 1350.40
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